Empirical studies have documented the existence of the public-private pay differentials in both developed and developing countries. The implementation of policies aiming to reduce this gap has however been mitigated or inconclusive. This paper exploits the Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP) in Ghana as a natural experiment to examine the effectiveness of wage policies in developing countries. The SSPP was implemented in 2010 by the Government of Ghana to address the public-private sector wage gap and improve productivity in the public sector. Using a quantile treatment effect approach based on a Difference-In-Difference (DID) estimation, we show that the SSPP has yet to reduce the wage gap between the public and private sectors across the entire distribution of earnings in Ghana. The improvement observed is only at the lower tail of the distribution of earnings. However, the SSPP has a larger effect on the earnings of female workers than that of males in the public sector, suggesting that the policy was successful in reducing the gender-wage gap in the public sector. Moreover, the SSPP has decreased the productivity of workers across the distribution of earnings, mainly due to a decrease in the effort of females public sector workers. Nevertheless, the SSPP has had some successes and could be improved by putting in place a good managerial quality in the government' agencies. In addition, it is important that the Government pays much attention to various macroeconomic factors that have challenged the success of the SSPP.
I Introduction
The implementation of policies aiming to reduce the public-private sector wage gap have received considerable attention in recent years, especially in developed countries (Lausev 2014) . Bregn (2013) finds that 80 percent of employers in the OECD economies have either implemented such a wage policy or intended to do so, with the purpose of not only addressing the wage differential but also to increase workers' productivity (Bajorek & Bevan 2015) . Their success, however, has been mitigated or inconclusive. While some studies found that adopting a wage policy increases earnings in the public sector (Hasnain & Pierskalla 2012) , their effects on productivity have not been addressed. Bryson et al. (2012) , Lucifora & Origo (2015) argued that wage policies increase workers' productivity marginally, but their studies remain silent on how such policies correct wage disparities between sectors. Most studies on wage gap often focus on the private sector and little attention is usually paid to the public sector; e.g. (Prentice et al. 2007) . Despite the progress made by many countries in recent years to close the public-private sector wage gap, the realisation of this goal remains a challenge especially in developing economies.
The few developing countries that implemented wage policies, such as Ghana, have no clear scientific measure of their success.
This study aims to fill this gap by using the Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP) in Ghana as a natural experiment to examine the effects of wage policies in developing countries. In particular, we investigate whether such a policy reduces the public-private sector wage gap, while achieving maximum productivity. Using the private sector as a control group, we employ a quantile treatment effect approach based on a Difference-InDifference (DID) estimation to show that the SSPP has yet to reduce the public-private sector wage gap across the entire distribution of earnings in Ghana. The improvement observed is only at the lower tail of the distribution of earnings. Nevertheless, the SSPP has a larger effect on the earnings of female workers than that of males in the public sector, suggesting that the policy was successful in reducing the gender-wage gap in the public sector. Moreover, the policy has decreased the productivity of workers across the effort distribution, mainly due to a decrease in the effort of female public sector workers.
Our findings are similar to Damiani et al. (2016) who estimate a positive policy effect across the quantiles of earnings and productivity of Italians firms. While, Damiani et al. (2016) find a positive U-shaped curve, we find a (near) U-shaped distributional policy effect on earnings but a downward distributional effect on workers' productivity. When considering gender differences, we find that the SSPP has a positive and near U-shaped effect on earnings of females workers but a downward distributional effect on that of males. In addition, the SSPP has a downward effect on the productivity of female workers, while its effect on that of male workers is an inverted W-shape.
Overall, our findings do not align with the literature on efficiency wage theory that postulates an increase in workers' productivity after the implementation of wage policies.
The efficiency wage theory assumes that a higher wage will result in increased effort, thus leading to an increase in productivity. The reasons for such a relationship are that, first, high-paid workers would not shirk knowing the opportunity cost of being fired or losing their wages (Shapiro & Stiglitz 1984 , Alexopoulos 2002 . Second, as a form of showing appreciation and gratitude to employers, employees will respond positively to an increase in wages with an increase in effort, thus leading to higher productivity (Akerlof 1982 (Akerlof , 1984 . Lastly, if workers perceive a given wage as fair, there is a high chance they will increase their effort, which in turn will increase their productivity (Akerlof & Yellen 1990 ).
By emphasizing on identifying the causal effect of wage policies, our study contributes to the existent literature on efficient wage policies, and also shed a new light on the disparity between developed and underdeveloped countries on this topic. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to empirically examine the effect of wage policies in sub-Saharan countries using the novel causal quantile treatment effect approach recently proposed by Powell (2016) , along with the DID estimation. First, by conditioning on workers' unobservable characteristics, we are able to identify the causal effect of the wage policy, despite the presence of other confounding factors which may have contributed to changes in earnings during the period. Second, most studies of wage policies in the public sector have been limited to workers in the health and education sectors (Makinson 2000 , Prentice et al. 2007 . By contrast, our analysis of the wage policy effectiveness covers the whole public sector. Third, by distinguishing heterogeneous sub-groups of workers, our results show that the effect of the SSPP is not uniform across these subgroups. In particular, while women and low-income workers benefited from the policy, males and high-income workers did benefit less, which indicates clearly that the meantype regression analysis, as often done in the literature, may not be an appropriate way to investigate this type of policies. Moreover, from a methodological viewpoint, an interesting contribution of our study is the use of pseudo panels. The absence of genuine panel data covering all areas in Ghana makes it difficult to have individual observations on workers over time. Following Deaton (1985) , we construct a panel data with individual time-invariant characteristics such as year of birth, gender, and ethnic composition of workers.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the background and a brief description of the SSPP. Section III introduces the data and the variables used in the study. Section IV details our empirical strategy. Section V discusses the findings and we present some robustness checks in Section VI. Section VII concludes. The introduction of democratic rule in 1992, along with subsequent economic reforms, have spurred the expansion of new enterprises, mostly in the private sector. While this rapid development of the private sector has improved earnings for workers, as most private sector employers pay higher wages, the same is yet to be materialized in the public sector. Several studies have found that the public-private pay differential was between 15 to 20 percent prior to 2010 (Glewwe 1991 , Verner 1999 , Baah & Reilly 2009 ). This differential was worse for workers on the lower tail of earnings' distribution.
II The Single Spine Pay Policy in Ghana
Several wage negotiations to address this issue fell through, leading to numerous strikes and a fall in workers hours of work and productivity. Baah & Reilly (2009) evidenced that the hazard rate of strikes is positively related to the strike durations in Ghana.
More precisely, their results indicate a higher rate of strikes lasting as long as 30 days (Figure 1b) . In addition, they also found that between 1980 and 2004, the public sector had lost on average 5.8 days of work per year as a result of strikes compared to 3.3 days per year in the private sector.
Over decades of failed attempts to address the public-private pay gap and improve workers' productivity in the public sector, the Government of Ghana introduced the Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP) and implemented it on January 1, 2010. In addition to addressing the public-private sector wage gap, the SSPP aimed not only to reduce the strikes in the public sector and the frequency of wage negotiations, but also to retain skilled workers in the public sector (FWSC 2009) . To the government, achieving these objectives were a probable way of containing the cost of the public sector wage bill and ensuring that public sector workers productively spend 8 hours a day and 40 hours a The late receipt of the rents saw the government paying off arrears to the public sector workers from 2011. However, while well-intentioned, the SSPP may not have a significant impact on the earnings in the public sector due to the expansionary trend in the GDP per capita since 1992 (Figure 1d ). This increase may be attributed to many factors such as the establishment of new enterprises (as mentioned earlier). Therefore, the rising earnings may be a reflection of the increasing trend in the performance of the economy, rather than the impact of new oil discoveries which facilitated the implementation of the policy. This study aims to clarify this issue by proposing an econometric strategy to identify the causal effect of the SSPP.
III Data
We use data from the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS), rounds 4,5 and 6 con- and other demographic variables. We restrict our sample to only respondents above 15 years 2 and employed.
As the GLSS is a repeated cross-section data, the unavailability of a panel form makes it difficult to follow the respondents over time. We tackle this challenge by constructing a pseudo panel (Deaton 1985) . The approach is such that respondents are grouped into cohorts according to the same time invariant characteristics that identify them.
We then compute averages of continuous time-varying variables for each cohort across each survey and used them as observations. Discrete time varying variables like marital status and household status (head or not) are, however, used as reported because they are
1 The GLSS has a wider coverage than the Ghana Household Urban Population Survey which is a panel and covers only the urban cities in Ghana.
2 This is because by the International Labour Law, working at age below 15 years is a child labour.
considered to be rid of errors (Deaton 1985) . The individual fixed effect which identifies the unobserved heterogeneity in a panel data is then referred to as a cohort fixed effect.
Though this is not necessarily following individuals over time but rather cohorts, it makes it possible to infer individuals' behavior from a group with similar characteristics. In the literature, the widely used time-invariant characteristics to construct cohorts have been the birth year and gender. We use these variables for the reasons that they depict the life-cycle and existing wage differentials between and among workers. The well-known Mincer (1974) wage equation considers age (experience) as an important determinant of earnings, and this was proven to be the case in Ghana (Glewwe 1991) . Glewwe (1991) found that the age-earning profile depicts the experience and earning profile of workers, and that even within the same age-earning profile, there exists a pay differential by gender. Various studies, Newell & Reilly (1996) , Cohen & Huffman (2007) and Aizer (2010) also found that the gender wage gap exists in both developed and developing countries, mostly in favor of men.
In addition to year of birth and gender, we also construct cohorts using the ethnic composition of the respondents. The use of the ethnic composition to construct cohorts is inspired by Easterly & Levine (1997) , who investigated the effect of ethnic diversity on economic development in both developed and developing countries. They found that diversity of ethnic backgrounds in most countries (developed and developing) influences the differences in income and productivity. Easterly & Levine (1997) argue that these differences arise from various innate capabilities that characterise each ethnic group, making ethnicity an important factor to consider when estimating earnings and productivity.
The Ghanaian population is very diverse with different ethnic groups. This diversity affect their upbringing and this is reflected in their years of education, choice of work, and their earnings (Easterly & Levine 1997 , Le 1999 , Swee 2015 . Across Ghana, the ethnic groups are widely dispersed in the regions. However, each region is very well In forming cohorts, it is necessary to ensure that there is enough heterogeneity in the groups. This requirement calls for larger cohort size and groups. The restriction on the available data makes it difficult to ensure these two requirements are satisfied, which usually leads to a trade-off between efficiency and bias. This is because a larger cohort size will reduce the number of groups (thus rendering the estimates efficient but biased), whereas a small cohort size and a larger number of groups will result in less efficient estimates but rid of bias. Verbeek & Nijman (1992) note that the main problem of cohort fixed effect is that it is time-varying, unobserved and very likely to be correlated with the averages of the variables. With the average cohort effect varying over time, treating them as random will result in inconsistent estimates, and treating them as fixed will lead to identification problems unless the variation of the cohort effect over time can be neglected. However, with cohorts sizes of at least 100, there is a chance of having the errors resulting from averaging the variables being neglected, and the estimates being consistent (Verbeek & Nijman 1992) .
We form the cohorts, first, by combining all ethnic groups with less than 1,000 respondents as "Others." This group together with the Akan, Ewe, Ga-Adamgbe, Guan and Mole-Dagbani make up 6 ethnic groups. We then form the year of birth cohort by using different year intervals (25, 16, 6) so as to have an equal proportion (16 percent) of respondents in each cohort. Using equal year intervals will leave some year cohorts with fewer respondents. We finally form the cohorts from 6 ethnic groups, 6 birth years and 2 gender groups giving us 72 groups 4 in each survey. Sixteen (16) percent of the total created cohorts have less than 100 respondents; this is tolerable from the literature on pseudo panel construction.
IV Empirical Strategy
To identify the effect of the SSPP, we use a quantile treatment approach along with a Difference-In-Difference (DID) estimation. Section A details the specification used, while Section B discusses briefly the identification issues related to this type of models.
A Model specification
We consider the following quantile treatment effect framework (Powell 2016) :
where Y ct refers to the average of the outcome variables-log of monthly labour earnings or log of weekly hours of work (effort)-of cohort c at time t; (P U B × P OL) is our variable of interest-P U B and P OL are indicators for public sector and period after the SSPP-with coefficient of interest β(U ct ) measuring the effect of the SSPP on monthly earnings or effort of workers; X ct is a vector of covariates-years of education, years of experience and demographic factors-and its coefficient γ measures the effect of a change in these covariates on log of monthly earnings or log of weekly hours of work; a t , r c and s c are year, regional, and industry-specific fixed effects respectively, that address any potential endogeneity in the variable of interest, (P U B × P OL). U ct denotes timeinvariant and time-varying characteristics, modelled as a function of the cohort fixed effects A c and the idiosyncratic shocks V ct . It is worth noting that the policy effect, β(U ct ) is time-varying as U ct incorporates time-varying characteristics.
The underlying assumption is that for P U B ×P OL to be exogenous, there should not be any information provided about U ct conditional on X ct , i.e U ct |P U B × P OL, X ct has zero τ quantile. This means that, changes in P U B ×P OL and X ct are uncorrelated with changes in U ct when the cohort effects are controlled for. This implies that the structure of the rank is conditionally stable and yields the distribution of
The function U ct is often called the rank variable and it indicates the variation in the coefficients β(U ct ) and γ(U ct ) at the τ -quantile of Y ct . Therefore, U ct indicates how these coefficients are to be interpreted in the quantile regression. The rank structure is useful in defining the distribution of the potential outcomes, thus workers with high quantiles have high value of U ct which is a function of their cohort and idiosyncratic effects. The assumption on the rank structure is commonly used in the literature, and allows for recovering the joint distribution from the marginal ones. Each observation is assumed to maintain its rank in the distribution of earnings and effort regardless of the treatment status so that the estimated effect is the treatment effect for observations at the quantile of the potential outcome distributions (Melly & Wüthrich 2016) . This rank assumption is different from that with additive fixed effects. While the former yields the estimation of the distribution of Y ct |P U B × P OL, X ct , the latter approach only yields the estimation on the distribution of (Y ct − U ct )|P U B × P OL, X ct . This means that in the latter, individuals at the bottom of the distribution (Y ct − U ct )|P U B × P OL, X ct may be closer to the top of the distribution Y ct |P U B ×P OL, X ct , thus contradicting the rank assumption. Interestingly, Powell (2016) methodology of estimating the quantiles of Y ct |P U B × P OL, X ct yields consistent estimates even for short T (T = 3 in this study), which is an advantage over quantile regressions with additive fixed effects that require large T .
Conditioning on covariates like educational attainment and years of experience matters in the determination of earnings and productivity; e.g., Mincer (1974 ), Glewwe (1991 , and Adamchik & Bedi (2000) . Other factors like marital status, household head status, and father's working status also influence earnings (Le 1999) . Ignoring these variables will result in a misspecified model, thus leading to imprecise estimates (Powell 2016 ).
The year fixed effects help in capturing various economic and political happenings that have evolved over time. Ignoring the activities of government which could in a way influence the earnings of workers will affect the identification of the policy effect.
One interesting factor that made it possible for the implementation of the policy was the availability of an extra source of funding for the government as a result of an oil discovery in 2007. A new source of funding was needed as the government did not have stored up funds to embark on such a huge expenditure. The performance of the economy prior to the SSPP implementation, as noted by the World Bank, was declining with an annual growth rate averaging 6 percent. The growth rate increased from 5 percent in 2010 to 14 percent in 2011 ( Figure 1c , Section 2) and declined to 9 percent the following year World Bank (2017) . This shock could be attributed to the discovery and extraction of new oil fields from 2010. This discovery may make the policy endogenous and not accounting for this may result in an inefficient estimation of the policy effect. One way to address this, is to have a time dummy for the period of the oil discovery. The data available does not allow to have a different time dummy for the period after oil discovery and the pay policy. However, the inclusion of the year fixed effect helps to address this problem. Another way is the inclusion of regional effects which will account for the economic activities that evolved after the oil discovery.
The inclusion of the cohort fixed effect and industry-specific fixed effect is of essence as this helps in not attributing the effect of time invariant traits to the policy.
The literature on efficiency wages considers working hours as a measure of effort. (Katz 1986 , Campbell 2006 . Effort, according to the literature, is positively related to the level of productivity of a firm or an individual. In Ghana, workers are by law 5 required to work 8 hours a day and 40 hours a week for a full time work. This is admonished in the public sector and it was a reason for the government agreeing to a new pay policy. The believe is that, effectively working within this stipulated hours will result in higher level of productivity and result in a cut in employment in the public sector. This institutional setting renders it possible to measure the effort of workers, thus their level of productivity, through hours of work. Considering the unavailability of a better measure of productivity from the individual data, and more importantly the underlying theory, we use hours of work as an 'indirect' measure of productivity. We propose two approaches in measuring effort. First, we use log of weekly hours of work.
This approach is deemed appropriate as it is easier to capture a possible change in effort on average and also at the quantiles. Next we use a dummy that takes 1 if an individual works at least 40 hours a week (more productive worker) and 0 otherwise (less productive worker).
We estimate the DID model using the Generalized Methods of Moments(GMM) approach by Powell (2016) with two moment conditions. The first is the within transformation of the data which ensures that the within cohorts comparison is used for identification. The second moment condition ensures that, on average, the expected probability of each cohort is equal to the quantile function. The two moment conditions can be written formally as:
where Z ct and Z cs are instruments in cohort c at time t and s, D is the treatment variable, P U B × P OL , τ is the τ -quantile of Y ct , and q(D cs , τ ) is a strictly increasing function of τ . The GMM estimator obtained by using the two moments conditions in (1)-(2) may be difficult to compute. Powell (2016) proposes to use the following equivalent moment conditions:
where
is a weighting matrix, and N is the size of cohorts. Restricting the parameters to 
B Threat to Identifying a Significant Policy Effect
The source of a policy variation needs to be understood better in order to avoid making erroneous inferences (Besley & Case 2000) . A change in the monthly earnings and weekly hours of work could be as a result of series of factors but not necessarily the policy. Also, an important factor to consider is the control group with which the treated group is being compared to. The private sector is an equally viable option for public sector workers provided they find their efforts not to be rewarded accordingly. We use the private sector as a control group because there is a fear that the government will lose its workers to this sector, but not the other way around (FWSC 2009). Although there is job security in the public sector, the monetary gain is a clear cut for workers to move to the private sector (Adamchik & Bedi 2000) . From that perspective, we are interested in the existence of factors that could result in changes in monthly earnings and effort in favour of either the public or private sector. Table 1 shows the mean differences in the monthly earnings, weekly hours of work among other explanatory variables of both sectors, prior to the implementation of the Experience refers to the number of years of actively being working. Married worker is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent is married and 0 otherwise, and similarly for Male workers. Formally employed
Father is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondents' father has/had a white collar job. Standard errors are in parentheses, * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
SSPP. The public sector workers seem, on average, to be more educated and highly experienced than those of the private sector, but such differences are statistically insignificant to contribute to any change in the monthly earnings and weekly hours of work. A closer look at the income and effort of workers reveal the story about unfolding. Figure 3 depicts the earnings of workers before and after the policy. There is an increase in the earnings of the public sector but their weekly hours of work have decreased marginally after the SSPP was implemented. The distribution of the earnings in these two sectors, as depicted show that the public sector earnings are concentrated around the mean after the policy was introduced, with a reduction in the distribution towards the lower tail.
This indicates homogeneity in the earnings of most workers in that sector, and similarly for the private sector. Regarding the weekly hours of work in Figure 4 , the distribution did not change much for both sectors but a large fraction of workers have their weekly hours of work close to the mean after the SSPP was implemented. This, however, may not be enough in establishing the absence of selections on unobservable factors. We thus conduct placebo tests, as well as other robustness checks in section B to ensure the estimates are well identified.
V Results
For clarity, we present the effects of the SSPP on earnings and effort on separate sections. Table 2 shows the estimates of the policy effect on log of monthly earnings. The OLS and pooled quantile estimates based on Koenker & Bassett Jr (1978) are presented in Table 2 .I and Table 2 .II, whereas Table 2 .III shows the quantile fixed effect (QRPD) estimates using the approach by Powell (2016) . The estimates in Table 2 .I with no individual controls and cohort effects suggest the SSPP has a positive and statistically significant effect on average, and also across the earnings distribution, except at the 90 th quantile. Including controls for workers' education, years of experience, marital status, presence of union at place of work, household status (head or not), and fathers' choice of work (white collar job or not), reduces the policy effect on average and also across quantiles of the distribution (Table 2 .II). The reduction in the effect of the SSPP after the inclusion of control variables indicates the role individual factors play in determining earnings. Across the quantiles of the log of monthly earnings, the SSPP had its highest effect at the lower tail of the distribution and the impact decreases gradually as the quantiles increase. Figure 5 shows the graphs of the estimates in Table 2 .II. The DID estimates are on the y-axis and the quantiles of log of monthly earnings on the xaxis. The effect of the policy is significantly above and below the average effect (OLS), indicating the heterogeneous nature of the policy on the monthly earnings in the public sector.
A Policy Effect on Earnings
These effects, however, reduces with the inclusion of the cohort fixed effects as shown in Table 2 .III and in Figure 5 . The inclusion of the cohort fixed effect indicates that omitting the unobserved heterogeneity arising from the year of birth, the gender and ethnic composition, will bias the effect of the SSPP upwards. Another significant result is that the effect of the SSPP is positive on average but negative and significant beyond the median quantile; indicating a negative effect on the earnings of public sector workers.
Whereas the SSPP increased the monthly earnings of public sector workers at the 10 th quantile by 21.45 and 13.24 percentage points for workers at the 25 th quantile, it reduced the monthly earnings of public sector workers at the 75 th quantile by 0.56 and 0.48 percentage points for those at the 90 th quantile. Table 2 also shows the public-private earnings gap in the absence of the SSPP. The first row of every panel shows the public sector workers, on average, earn less than their private counterparts, and also at every quantile of the earnings distribution. Though not statistically significant on average, these wage gaps are significant at the lower tails of the earnings distribution, with or without controls. The true effect of the SSPP is obtained as the sum of the public-private wage gap and the DID estimate in Table 2 .III.
We see that although the effect of the SSPP is positive, its objective of addressing the earnings gap was not realised as the public sector earn between 30 to 90 percent less across the quantiles. 
B Policy Effect on Effort
We examine the effect of the SSPP on the effort of public sector workers. The estimates using the log of hours of work as outcome variable is presented in Table 3 . As before, the OLS and pooled quantile estimates based on Koenker & Bassett Jr (1978) are presented in (Table 3 .I) and (Table 3 .II) respectively, whereas Table 3 .III shows the fixed effect QRPD estimates using the approach by Powell (2016) . The DID estimates with no individual controls and cohort fixed effects are positive and significant on average and also at the 10 th quantile, but negative and significant at the 90 th quantile of weekly hours.
This indicates a fall in the effort of public sector workers after the implementation of the SSPP.
The inclusion of individual controls reduces the effect of the wage policy on public sector effort on average and also at the 10 th quantile. The effect, however, is negative from the median and only statistically significant at the 90 th quantile (Table 3 .II). Moreover, the SSPP effect on the effort of public sector workers reduces and turn negative on average and also beyond the median after including the cohort fixed effect (Table 3 .III). Figure 6 shows the SSPP effect on the effort of workers. There is a significant effect of the SSPP below and above the average indicating that the heterogeneous effect across the quantiles is informative as an average estimate will disregard the reduction in effort of workers at higher tails of the effort distribution.
Like in the case of monthly earnings, the SSPP did not achieve its objective of ensuring an increase in the effort and in turn the productivity in the public sector. The public-private effort gap, without the policy, is significantly positive on average and also at the 90 th quantile (Table 3. An alternative approach to test for the effectiveness of the SSPP on effort is to use a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an individual works 40 hours or more a week, and 0 otherwise. We find that the SSPP has, on average, insignificantly reduced the effort of public sector work by around 10 percent (Table A.6). Individual controls and cohort fixed effects are the same as in Section A. Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 reps. are in parentheses for parts I and II and the MCMC ones for III. * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
C Heterogeneity across gender
The heterogeneity of the effect of the SSPP is not observed only along the distribution of earnings and effort, but also across gender. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present the DID estimates of the policy on earnings and effort for males (Table 6 .1) and females (Table 6 .2). The results suggest that the effect of the SSPP on earnings are mainly driven by males. As it is positive and significantly higher for females, especially at the tails of the distribution of earnings, male public sector workers experience a negative and significant decrease of their earnings beyond the median of the distribution.
The magnitude of the public-private pay differential shows that female workers in the public sector were paid less relative to males workers, and that the policy has provided a mechanism to resolve this gender-pay gap. The overall effect, however, is negative on average and also across the distribution of earnings for both males and females, after accounting for the public-private wage differential. On average, the public-private wage differential is about 14 percent, and between 4 to 19 percent across the distribution of earnings. Nevertheless, males in the public sector are worse of than females after the implementation of the SSPP.
The effect of the SSPP on effort, however, is negative on average for both males and females, but positive and significant for females at the 10 th and 25 th quantiles. At the 90 th quantile, the effect of the SSPP on effort is a higher negative for males than females. In addition, while the effect of the SSPP is downward sloped for females along the distribution of effort, that of males is inverted W-shaped ( Figure 6-(d) ). Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 reps. are in parentheses for FE and the MCMC ones for QRPD. * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
The objective of the policy to simultaneously reduce the public-private pay and effort gaps may not be completely unattainable but more work needs to be done to shape the policy in that direction. For example, the inability of the current form of the SSPP to catch up with rising earnings in the private sector may be due to the rigid nature of the pay system in the public sector. Most private sector employers adjust their employees' earnings to changing macroeconomic performance such as inflation and living standard, which is not the case in the public sector.
VI Robustness Checks A Instrumental Variable Estimation of Policy Effect
An important threat to identifying the effect of the SSPP is that it may not be exogenous, thus resulting to the previous estimates being inaccurate. The activities of trade unions in the public sector has contributed largely to the implementation of the SSPP. Therefore, we use the presence of unions at the work place in public sector as an instrumental variable for the SSPP. The classical IV-diagnostic tests (Table A .7) indicate clearly that this IV is not poor, so we proceed with the QRPD-IV estimation. The QRPD-IV The instrument for the P ublicXP olicy is the presence of unions in the public sector. Standard errors from the MCMC method are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
estimates are shown in Table 7 align qualitatively with our previous analysis in Section V. Quantitatively, the SSPP has a smaller effect on monthly earnings at higher tail of the distribution compared with the results of Section V. Regarding effort, the difference between the QRPD-IV estimates in Figure 8 and that of the standard QRPD estimates in Section II are quite similar. We use 2006 as a fictitious year rather than 2013 as the year after the policy was implemented. Standard errors from the MCMC algorithm are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
would be wrongly attributed. We thus expect this pseudo policy not be significant. As shown in Table 8 , our expectation is met as the estimates are not significant across the distribution of both the monthly earnings and effort.
The literature on earnings and productivity argues that earnings and productivity should increase after a training program (Heckman & Smith 2004 , De Grip & Sauermann 2013 , Konings & Vanormelingen 2015 . In our case, a significant coefficient for a training program after the implementation of the policy will bias the estimates attributed to the SSPP. To investigate this, we consider workers who undertook a training program for a month or more after the SSPP was implemented. This information is available in Standard errors from the MCMC method are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
our data. Table 9 presents the QRPD estimates. The effect of the training program is insignificant across the quantiles of both the monthly earnings and effort, thus suggesting that our analysis in Section V is likely not impacted by confounding factors.
VII Policy implications and concluding remarks
In this study, we examine the effect of the Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP) implemented in 2010 by the Government of Ghana. The SSPP objectives were to: (i) address the public-private wage gap, and (ii) increase the productivity in the public sector. Using a quantile treatment effect approach based on a Difference-In-Difference (DID) estimation, we show that the SSPP has yet to reduce the public-private sector pay differentials across the whole distribution of earnings in Ghana. The improvement observed is mostly at the lower tail of the distribution of earnings. Nevertheless, the SSPP was successful in reducing the gender-wage gap in the public sector, but the policy has also decreased the productivity of workers, mainly due to a decrease in the effort of females workers in the public sector. Our findings are supported by a number of robustness checks, and the quantile approach adopted shows that examining a policy effect at the averages may not always be the appropriate as noted by Firpo (2007) .
The reduction in the effort after the implementation of the policy, especially by female workers in the public sector, requires more attention. Indeed, females public sector workers compared to males have seen a major reduction in their hours of work after 2010. The backward bending nature of their supply curve is mostly seen beyond the 25 th quantile of the distribution of hours of work. Our understanding of this phenomena is that most females in the public sector with hours of work beyond the 25 th quantile are married and have children. The young and unmarried women are mostly those willing to spend 8 hours a day at work, as they have less family responsibilities. For example, Heath (2017) found in urban Ghana that women are likely to reduce their hours of work when they have children, except if they are self-employed. Another factor that could also explain the fall in effort in the public sector is the increasing number of strikes after the implementation of the SSPP. Most public sector workers were critical of this policy, and this was accentuated by their increase participation in unions'activities.
Furthermore, the discrepancies associated with late payments of wages and the possibility that some workers will not be paid in full, has resulted in a far more severe strikes in the public sector. This late payments mostly stem from the inconsistencies in the rents from the oil sale. As shown in Figure 1c , the fall in the contribution of oil rents to total GDP along with the over-dependence on the gains from a volatile source have introduced a lot of uncertainties in the pay of public sector workers. This volatile nature of the oil rents raises the question of whether the SSPP can be sustained. It is fair to say that the ability of the Government to sustain this policy will largely depend on how it cautiously manages its expenditure, and more importantly the allocation of its resources towards more diverse productive areas.
Other macroeconomic factors have impacted the success of the SSPP. In particular, the continuous rise in inflation and daily depreciation of the local currency do not align with a policy that is revised only at the end of a calendar year. In the private sector, most firms have policies or measures that facilitate the revision of wages within a year to account for changing environment and living costs. This is quasi-nonexistent in the public sector, which does not favor a policy like the SSPP to have its desired impact.
Nevertheless, the SSPP has had some successes. In particular, this policy has reduced the gender-wage gap in the public sector, and it could be improved by putting in place a good managerial quality in the government' agencies. Also, our econometric analysis of the effect of this policy has some challenges. For example, the availability of data does not make it possible to measure the effect of the policy over a longer time period. We hope that future research could be done in that perspective once data become available.
A Appendix
A Construction of pseudo panels 1930-1955 4,001 16.24 1956-1962 3,772 15.31 1963-1968 4,156 16.87 1969-1975 4,176 16.95 1976-1982 4,197 17.03 1983-1999 4,337 17.60 Total 24,639 100.00 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 The IV is the presence of a trade union at the work place in the public sector.
B IV diagnostics

